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1lntroduction
The fiscal authority determines the total quantity of the government’s liabilities by issuing bonds, whereas the
role of the monetary authority is to determine the composition of the liabilities via open market operations.
In the literature, most research focuses on how monetary policy actions -changes in the composition of the
government’s liabilities -affect the real economy and the rate of inflation. This paper is intended to add
some new insights into the interaction between debt, growth, and inflation. To do so, this paper takes a
monetary endogenous growth model and considers arather unusual policy tool: control of the public debt.
The conventional wisdom is that the fiscal authority affects the government’ total liabilities and all the
monetary variables such as the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate are under complete control of
the monetary authority. Such aconventional view has been challenged by Sargent and Wallace’s (1981)
“some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic” and more recently by the school of the “fiscal theory of the price
level.” Their main message is that the monetary policy alone cannot control inflation because fiscal and
monetary policies are connected by asingle government’s budget constraint so the fiscal authority’s actions
limit the monetary authority’s degree of freedom. This paper takes this view further and asks: can the
fiscal authority control inflation by targeting the quantity of bonds it issues? In abroad sense it studies
implications of debt targeting for growth and inflation.
The analytical framework is an extension of Kudoh (2002), who presents aone-sector endogenous growth
model with money and bonds. The model is in principle an endogenous growth version of Sargent and
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Wallace’s (1981) overlapping generations economy. Iadopt aquick way to endogenize the output growth rate.
Namely, Ifollow Smith (1991) and more recently Espinosa and Yip (1999) to assume that the production
technology exhibits some degree of externality so that the aggregate production function is of AK type.
Iadopt Lucas and Stokey’s (1983) cash-in-advance formulation to introduce money that is demanded
even when it is dominated by other assets in rates of return. One of the reasons why Iavoid the money-
in-the utility-function (MIUF) formulation, which is another famous (and tractable) short-cut method of
modeling return-dominated money, is that model builders must take extra care of the issue of the timing
of trades, as pointed out by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001). In the standard MIUF model, the real money
balance after all transactions took place enters the utility function. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) named this
situation “cash-when-I’$\mathrm{m}$-done timing.” It will be shown that Lucas and Stokey’s (1983) cash-in-advance
formulation gives rise to awell-defined money demand function that is decreasing in the nominal interest
rate.
Using the ffamework, Ifirst study amodel with debt targeting and interest rate pegging. Because of
the presence of budget deficits, there are two distinct balanced growth equilibria. As pointed out by Evans
et al. (1998), the standard stability analysis does not apply to such amodel because the model’s initial
condition (stated as alevel of capital stock) does not pin down atime path of capital stock. For this reason,
Iutilize an adaptive learning scheme as an equilibrium selection device. The basic idea of adaptive learning
adopted in this paper is to describe behaviors of agents outside of equilibria under aparticular adaptive
learning mechanism, and find amapping that maps from the PLM (perceived law of motion) to the ALM
(actual law of motion). Aperfect-foresight equilibrium is said to be $\mathrm{E}$-stable(expectationally stable) if such
alearning scheme converges to that equilibrium.
Aprimary finding regarding stability is that it is the low-growth equilibrium that is E–stable. The
high-growth equilbrium is either $\mathrm{B}$-stable or $\mathrm{B}$-unstable, depending on the level of primary deficit and the
targeted debt-GDP ratio. If the level of primary deficit is low or the targeted debt-GDP ratio is high,
then both equilbria become E–stable, causing xpectational indeterminacy, the possibility raised in Kudoh
(2002).
It is well-known in the literature that sunspot equilibria of various forms exist in amodel with multiplicity
or indeterminacy. Recently Evan and Honkapohja $(1994, 2001\mathrm{b})$ addressed the issue of stability, rather
than existence, of sunspot equilibria using the technique of adaptive learning. In the spirit of Evan and
Honkapohja $(1994, 2001\mathrm{b})$ , this paper takes up the issue of stability of possible sunspot equilibria of the
model. In the model with nominal interest rate pegging, sunspots around the two distinct balanced growth
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equilibria exist, but the sunspots are not stable under learning.
Iextend the basic model to consider asomewhat extreme issue: can the fiscal authority control inflation
without an active central bank? The answer seems affirmative in the sense that there is aunique balanced
growth equilibrium in amodel in which the central bank lets all the monetary variables –the nominal
interest rate and the inflation rate -be determined by the market. It will be shown that there is aunique
balanced growth equilibrium, and that it is stable under learning. This suggests that it is possible that
the fiscal authority’s actions alone determine the long-run rates of growth and inflation. This would add
another support for the view that the fiscal authority’s coordinated actions are required for price (and
output) stability.
Recently Evan and Honkapohja $(1994, 2001\mathrm{b})$ consider existence and stability of sunspot equilibria near
a single indete rminate steady state. Their results imply that although uniqueness obtains, the economy
without an active monetary authority can be subject to adaptively stable sunspot fluctuations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2describes the model economy. Section 3presents
equilibria under debt targeting and interest rate pegging. Section 4asks whether the fiscal authority can
control inflation by targeting debt. Section 5concludes.
2The Model
2.1 Environment
Consider agrowing economy consisting of an infinite sequence of two period lived overlapping generations,
an initial old generation, and an infinitely-lived government. Let $t=1,2$ , $\ldots$ index time. At each date $t$ , a
new generation comprised of $N_{t}$ identical members appears where Inormalize $N_{t}=1$ for all $t$ . Each agent
is endowed with one unit of labor when young and is retired when old. In addition, the initial old agents
are endowed with $M_{0}>0$ units of fiat currency and $K_{1}>0$ units of capital.
There is asingle final good produced using the production function $\mathrm{Y}_{t}=A\overline{K}_{t}^{1-\alpha}K_{t}^{\alpha}L_{t}^{1-\alpha}$, where $A>1$
is aconstant, $\alpha\in(0,1)$ is the capital’s share, $\overline{K}_{t}$ is the aggregate capital stock, $K_{t}$ denotes the capital input,
and $L_{t}$ denotes the labor input at $t$ . The aggregate capital stock enters the production function because of
externality; the labor productivity rises as the society accumulates capital stock. Note that $\overline{K}_{t}=K_{t}$ holds
in equilibrium. In addition, capital is assumed to depreciate 100% between periods
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2.2 Factor Markets
Factor markets are perfectly competitive. Thus, factors of production receive their marginal product. Young
agents supply their labor endowment inelastically in the labor market. Thus, $L_{t}=1$ in equilibrium. When
make decisions, firms take the stock of aggregate capital, $\overline{K}_{t}$ , as given. Then the gross return on capital,
$r_{t+1}$ , and the real wage rate, $w_{t}$ , are given by
$r_{t}$ $=$
$\alpha A\overline{K}_{t}^{1-\alpha}K_{t}^{\alpha-1}L_{t}^{1-\alpha}=\alpha A$, (1)
$w_{t}$ $=$ $(1-\alpha)A\overline{K}_{t}^{1-\alpha}K_{t}^{\alpha}L_{t}^{-\alpha}=(1-\alpha)AK_{t}=(1-\alpha)$Y6. (2)
2.3 Consumers
Let $c_{1t}(c_{2t})$ denote the consumption of the final good by ayoung (old) agent born at date $t$ . In order
to simplify the analysis as much as possible, Iassume that agents care consumption only when old. This
immediately follows that $c_{1t}=0$ for all $t$ so all income will be saved.
Following Lucas and Stokey (1983) and more recently Woodford (1994), Iassume that consumption
goods are divided into two types: “cash goods” and “credit goods.” Cash goods must be purchased by cash,
so agents wishing to consume cash goods need cash in advance. On the other hand, agents do not need cash
to purchase credit goods. Ifollow Lucas and Stokey’s (1983) interpretation that at some stores an agent
is known to the producer so credit is available, while at other stores the agent is unknown to the seller so
cash must be used to make atransaction. Let $c_{mt}(cnt)$ denote the amount of cash (credit) goods consumed
when old. Then, $c_{2t}=c_{mt}+c_{nt}$ must hold. The cash-in-advance constraint is therefore
$p_{l+1}c_{mt}\leq M_{t}$ , (3)
where $p_{t}$ denotes the time $t$ price level and $M_{t}$ denotes the nominal money balance. According to (3), a
young agent must set aside cash in advance in order to purchase cash goods when old.
It is assumed that agents may hold money and non-monetary assets. The non-monetary assets, denoted
by $Z_{t}$ , are assumed to yield the gross nominal return of $I_{t+1}\geq 1$ in the next period. Iassume that agents
do not have access to any other storage technology. The budget constraint for ayoung agent born at date
$t$ is therefore
$M_{t}+Z_{t}\leq p_{t}w_{t}-T_{t}$ , (4)
where $T_{t}$ is the amount of tax paid. (4) states that ayoung agent of generation t receives nominal wage
income and allocates all disposable income to monetary and non-monetary assets (because no one consumae
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when young). Throughout, Iconsider only symmetric equilibria in which all agents of the same generation
have the same amount of assets. Since the nominal interest rate on money is zero, the budget constraint
when old is
$p_{t+1}c_{2t}\leq M_{t}+I_{t+1}Z_{t}$ . (5)
The cash-in-advance constraint binds if and only if money is dominated by non-monetary assets in rates
of return. In other words, the cash-in-advance constraint binds as long as the net nominal interest rate is
non-negative, or equivalently, $I_{t+1}\geq 1$ . Under the biding cash-in-advance constraint, $c_{mt}=M_{t}/p_{t+1}$ and
$c_{nt}=I_{t+1}Z_{t}/p_{t+1}$ .
Following Chari et al. (1991), Ispecify the utility function $\mathrm{a}s^{1}$
$U(\mathrm{q}_{nt}, c_{nt})=\ln(1-\sigma)c_{mt}^{1-\rho}+\sigma c_{nt}^{1-\rho}|h_{\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}_{\frac{1}{\mathrm{T}-\rho}}}\%$
, (6)
where $0<\sigma<1$ and $0<\rho<1$ . Each young agent chooses $Cmt$ and $c_{nt}$ to maximize (6) subject to
$c_{mt}=M_{t}/p_{t+1}$ , $c_{nt}=I_{t+1}Z_{t}/\mathrm{P}t+1$ , and $M_{t}+Z_{t}=p_{t}w_{t}-T_{t}$ . The first order necessary condition for the







It is important to check the properties of the money demand function just derived.
Lemma 17(/) satisfies (a) 7’ $(/)<0$ for $0<\rho<1$ , (b) $\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}tarrow\infty\gamma(I)=0$ for $0<\rho<1$ , (c) $0<\gamma(I)<1$ ,
and (d) $I\gamma’(I)/\gamma(I)=-[1-\gamma(I)](1-\rho)/\rho$.




$1+ \frac{\sigma}{1-\sigma}\cup$ I $\rho$ $\frac{\sigma}{1-\sigma}$ $\rho\frac{1-\rho}{\rho}I^{\underline{1}-A}p-1$ . (9)
It is then easy to check that $\gamma’(I)<0$ for $0<\rho<1$ . (b) Immediate from (8). (c) Obvious from (b). (d)
Straightforward from (9). $\blacksquare$
Lemma 1(a) states the condition under which the real money demand is decreasing in the nominal
interest rate. As the nominal interest rate increases, the household substitutes away from money, which
According to Chari et al. (1991), $\sigma=0.57$ , $\rho=0.17$ for the $\mathrm{U}.\mathrm{S}$ . economy. Note, however, that the parameter values are
for their model economy in which there is an infinitely lived agent, rather than aseries of overlapping generations
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reduces money demand. An increase in the nominal rates, at the same time, raises earning from bond
holding, which raises money demand through income effect. The former dominates the latter if $0<\rho<1$ ,
which Iassume to hold throughout. In addition, Iassume that $(1-\rho)I<1$ holds, which is plausible and
easily satisfied.
2.4 The Government
The government’s flow budget constraint is
$G_{t}=T_{t}+B_{t}-ItBt-i+Mt-Mt-1$ (10)
for $t\geq 2$ and $G_{1}+M_{0}=T_{1}+M_{1}+B_{1}$ for $t=1$ , where the initial stock of bonds is assumed to be zero. I
assume that the government simply consumes $G_{t}$ and that it does not affect utility of any generation or the
production process at any date. In order to simplify the analysis, divide (10) by $p_{t}\mathrm{Y}_{t}$ to obtain
$g_{t}= \tau_{t}+b_{t}-\frac{R_{t}}{\theta_{t}}b_{t-1}+m_{t}-\frac{p_{t-1}}{p_{t}}\frac{1}{\theta_{t}}m_{t-1}$ , (11)
where $\theta_{t}\equiv \mathrm{Y}_{t}/\mathrm{Y}_{t-1}$ , $g_{t}\equiv Gt/\{ptYt$ ) $y$ $\tau_{t}\equiv T_{t}/(p_{t}\mathrm{Y}_{t})$ , $b_{t}\equiv Tt/(ptYt)$ , $m_{t}\equiv M_{t}/(p_{t}\mathrm{Y}_{t})$ . Throughout, Iassume
that the government spending per GDP is constant over time, or, $g_{t}=g\in[0,1)$ for all $t$ .
3Equilibria with Debt Targeting and Interest Rate Pegging
3.1 Characterization
This section considers ascenario in which the fiscal authority targets the debt-GDP ratio and the central
bank pegs the nominal interest rate. Let $\overline{b}$ denote the targeted debt-GDP ratio where $0\leq\overline{b}<\infty$ . It follows
therefore that $b_{t}=\overline{b}$ and $I_{t}=I$ for all $t$ . Thus, the tax rate, $\tau_{t}$ , is endogenous. Before proceeding, note
that $\tau_{t}<1-\alpha$ is imposed to ensure $T_{t}<w_{t}=(1-\alpha)\mathrm{Y}_{t}$ , otherwise the household will be bankrupted by
taxes.
Amonetary equilibrium is defined as aset of sequences for allocations $\{m_{t}\}$ , $\{z_{t}\}$ , $\{k_{t}\}$ , $\{b_{t}\}$ , prices $\{r_{t}\}$ ,
$\{\mathrm{z}\mathrm{t}\}$ , {Pt}, and the initial conditions $M_{0}>0$ , $K_{1}>0$ , $B_{0}=0$ such that (a) the factor markets clear, $i.e.$ ,
(1) and (2) hold, (b) the asset market clears: $K_{t+1}+B_{t}/p_{t}=Zt/pu$ $(\mathrm{c})$ the allocations solve agents’ utility
maximization problem, (d) the cash-in-advance constraint (3) binds, or equivalently, $I_{t}>1$ holds, (e) the
government’s budget constraints, $pig+M_{0}=M_{1}+B_{1}$ for $t=1$ and (10) for $t>1$ , hold, (f) $I_{t}=I$ and
$g_{t}=g$ for all $t$ , and (g) $b_{t}=\overline{b}$ for all $t$ .
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The money market equilibrium requires that
$\frac{M_{t}}{p_{t}}=\gamma(I)w_{t}-\frac{T_{t}}{p_{t}}[\lrcorner\eta$
$=(1-\alpha-\tau_{t})\gamma(I)Y_{t}$ . (12)
Divide (12) by $\mathrm{Y}_{t}$ to obtain
$m_{t}=(1-\alpha-\tau_{t})\gamma(I)$ (13)
Since all income is saved, the asset market equilibrium requires that
$K_{t+1}+ \frac{B_{t}}{p_{t}}=w_{t}-\frac{T_{t}}{p_{t}}-\frac{M_{t}}{p_{t}}=(1-\alpha-\tau_{t})[1-\gamma(I)]Y_{t}$ . (14)
Divide (14) by $\mathrm{Y}_{t}$ and substitute $b_{t}=\overline{b}$ to obtain
$\theta_{t+1}=A(1-\alpha-\tau_{t})[1-$ $(\mathrm{I})\}-A\overline{b}$ . (13)
(15) immediately implies that at any equilibrium $\theta_{t+1}$ and $\tau_{t}$ are negatively related. In addition, the
condition $\tau_{t}<1-\alpha$ , combined with (15), requires that $\theta_{t+1}+A\overline{b}>0$. Substitute $R_{t}=\alpha A$, $b_{t}=\overline{b}$, (13),
and the Fisher equation into (11) to obtain
$g= \tau_{t}+\overline{b}-\frac{\alpha A}{\theta_{t}}\overline{b}+(1-\alpha-\tau_{t})\gamma(I)-\frac{\alpha A}{I}\frac{1}{\theta_{t}}(1-\alpha-\tau_{t-1})\gamma(I)$ . (16)
Substitute (15) into (16) and solve it for $\theta_{t+1}$ as afunction of $\theta_{t}$ alone as
$\theta_{t+1}=[1-g-\alpha H(I)]A-\frac{\alpha A^{2}\overline{b}H(I)}{\theta_{t}}\equiv\Omega(\theta_{t})$, (17)
where
$H(I) \equiv\frac{1-\gamma(I)+\gamma(I)/I}{1-\gamma(I)}=1+\frac{\gamma(I)/I}{1-\gamma(I)}>1$ . (18)
Equation (17) describes the equilibrium law of motion of the output growth rate. It will be helpful to study
some properties of the function $H$ .
Lemma 2The function $H$ satisfies $a$) $H’(I)<0$, and $b$) $H(1)=1+\mathrm{i}_{\frac{1-\sigma}{\sigma}\rho}^{\mathrm{t}_{1}}$ .
3.2 Balanced Growth Equilibria
At any balanced growth equilibrium, $\theta_{t}=\theta$ and $\tau_{t}=\tau<1-\alpha$ for all $t$ . Thus, abalanced growth equilibrium
solves
$\theta=[1-g-\alpha H(I)]A-\frac{\alpha A^{2}\overline{b}H(I)}{\theta}\equiv\Omega(\theta)$ . (19)
Lemma 3The function $\Omega$ satisfies (a) $\Omega’(\theta)>0$, (b) $\lim_{\thetaarrow 0}\Omega’(\theta)=\infty$ , (c) $\lim_{\thetaarrow\infty}\Omega’(\theta)=0$ , and (d)
$\lim_{\thetaarrow\infty}\Omega(\theta)=[1-g-\alpha H(I)]A$.
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Proof. From (19), it is easy to compute
$\Omega’(\theta)=\frac{\alpha A^{2}\overline{b}H(I)}{\theta^{2}}>0$ , and $\Omega’(\theta)=-\frac{2\alpha A^{2}\overline{b}H(I)}{\theta^{3}}<0$.
The rest of the proof is immediate. @
Proposition 4(a) There exist two distinct balanced growth equilibria if $[1-g-\alpha H(I)]^{2}/[4\alpha H(I)]\geq\overline{b}$ ,
(b) there exists a unique balanced growth equilibrium if $[1-g-\alpha H(I)]^{2}/[4\alpha H(I)]=\overline{b}$ , and (c) there exists
no balanced growth equilibrium if [l-g $-\alpha H(I)]^{2}/[4\mathrm{a}\mathrm{H}(I)]\leq\overline{b}$.
Proof. Rewrite (19) as the following quadratic form,
$\theta^{2}-[1-g-\alpha H(I)]A\theta+\alpha A^{2}\overline{b}H(I)=0$ ,
which has the roots
$\theta=\frac{[1-g-\alpha H(I)]A\pm A\overline{[1-g-\alpha H(I)]^{2}-4\alpha\overline{b}H(I)}\mathrm{q}}{2}$ . (20)
Thus, the roots are real if and only if $[1-g-\alpha H(I)]^{2}\geq 4\alpha\overline{b}H(I)$ . $\blacksquare$
Figure 1shows equilibria of the model. As is shown in the figure, there are normally two balanced growth
equilibria, the high-growth equilibrium, denoted by $\theta_{H}$ , and the low-growth equilibrium, $\theta_{L}$ . Obviously,
0’ (OH) $>1$ and $\Omega’(\mathrm{O}\mathrm{L})<1$ . It is important to check whether the condition $\tau<1-\alpha$ is ever violated.
Notice that, in this economy, the targeted public debt must be large enough for agiven level of the fiscal
deficits.
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Example 5 Let $A=3$ , $\alpha=0.33$ , $\rho=0.2$ , $\sigma=0.6$ , $g=0.02$ , $I=1.03$, and $\overline{b}=0.25$ . The $co$ spending
inflation rate $\iota s$ $\Pi=1.04$ . Under this specification, there are two balanced growth equilibria with $\theta=0.79$
and $\theta=1.05$ .
Proposition 6(a) An increase in the nominal interest rate reduces (raises) the output growth rate at the
low-growth (high-growth equilibrium, (b) An increase in the targeted debt $GDP$ ratio raises (reduces) the
output growth rate at the low-growth (high-growth) equilibrium, (c) An increase in the fiscal spending per
$GDP$ raises (reduces) the output growth rate at the lowgrowth (high-grow th equilibrium.
Proof. Prom (19) it is easy to compute
$\frac{d\theta}{dI}=\frac{-1-A\overline{b}/\theta}{1-\Omega’(\theta)}\alpha AH’(I)$ ,
where 0’ $(9\mathrm{H})>1$ and $\Omega’(\theta_{L})<1$ . Since $H’(I)<0$ , the 0locus shifts up. The rest is immediate, (b)
Prom (19) it is easy to compute
$\frac{d\theta}{d\overline{b}}=-\frac{\alpha A^{2}H(I)/\theta}{1-\Omega(\theta)},$.
The rest is immediate, (c) Omitted. $\blacksquare$
3.3 Stability under Learning
This subsection studies dynamic properties of equilibria. As is pointed out by Evans et al. (1998), one cannot
apply the standard stability analysis to the model. The reason is because the model’s initial condition, $K_{1}$ ,
does not pin down the next-period’s capital stock in this model. Thus, Ifollow Evans et al. (1998) to use
an adaptive learning scheme as an equilibrium selection $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}.2$ The basic idea is to consider behavior of
the economy outside of the perfect-foresight equilibria and to ask to which equilibrium agents’ expectations
converge.
Consider the following adaptive learning scheme,
$\theta_{t+1}^{e}=\theta_{t}^{\mathrm{e}}+\delta_{t+1}(\theta_{t-1}-\theta_{t}^{\mathrm{e}})$ , (21)
where $\theta_{t+1}^{\mathrm{e}}$ is apoint expectation of the output growth rate and $\delta_{t}=\delta/t$ is called the gain sequence. It is
said in the learning literature that information is lagged if the adaptive learning scheme is described by (21).
Alternatively, one could replace the learning rule with $\theta_{t+1}^{\mathrm{e}}=\theta_{t}^{e}+\delta_{t+1}(\theta_{t}-\theta_{t}^{e})$, which corresponds to the
$2\mathrm{G}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}$ discussions on learning as an equilibrium selection device can be found in Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and Lettau
and Van Zandt (forthcoming). See also Kudoh (2002)
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case in which information is current. Lettau and Van Zandt (forthcoming) point out that the use of current
information in the learning process could drastically change stability. Iadopt here the standard assumption
that information is lagged.
Solve (15) for the tax-GDP ratio to obtain
$\tau_{t}=1-\alpha$ $- \frac{\theta_{t+1}^{e}+A\overline{b}}{A[1-\gamma(I)]}$ , (22)
where $\theta_{t+1}^{e}$ is apoint expectation of the output growth rate and $h(I)\equiv 1-\gamma(I)+\gamma(I)/I$ . Equation (22)
states that the real tax revenue is determined once apoint expectation on the future output growth rate is
formed. Substitute (22) into (16) and solve it for the actual output growth rate to obtain
$\theta_{t}=\frac{\alpha A}{1-\gamma(I)}\frac{h(I)A\overline{b}+\theta_{t}^{\mathrm{e}}\gamma(I)/I}{(1-\alpha-g)A-\theta_{t+1}^{\mathrm{e}}}\equiv\Phi\theta_{t+1}^{\epsilon}\mathrm{i}$, $\theta_{t}^{e}\mathrm{t}$ (23)
which defines an important function that maps from point expectations on the output growth rates, $\theta_{t+1}^{\mathrm{e}}$
and $\theta_{t}^{\mathrm{e}}$ , to the actual output growth. Agents revise expectations using (21). Under perfect foresight, (23)
implies (19).
Substitute (23) into (21) to obtain $\theta_{t+1}^{\mathrm{e}}=\theta_{t}^{e}+\delta_{t+1}\Phi\theta_{t}^{e},$$\theta_{t-1}^{\epsilon}-\theta_{t}^{\mathrm{e}}\mathrm{i}|\mathrm{t}\mathrm{t}$ , which is a $\sec \mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\triangleleft \mathrm{r}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ system
in the expectations. Rewrite it as $(\theta_{t+\Delta}^{\mathrm{e}}-\theta_{t}^{\epsilon})/\Delta=\Phi\theta_{t}^{e}\mathrm{i}$ , $\theta_{t-\Delta}^{e}-\theta_{t}^{e}$ , where $\mathrm{A}=\delta_{t+1}$ . Notice that
$\mathrm{t}$
$\lim_{tarrow\infty}\Delta=0$ . It follows therefore the differential equation $d9e/ds=\Gamma(\theta^{e})-\theta^{e}$ , where
$\Gamma(\theta^{\mathrm{e}})\equiv\lim_{tarrow\infty}\Phi\theta_{t}^{e}\mathrm{i}$ , $\theta_{t-1}^{\mathrm{e}}=\mathrm{t}\frac{\alpha A}{1-\gamma(I)}\frac{A\overline{b}h(I)+\theta^{e}\gamma(I)/I}{(1-\alpha-g)A-\theta^{\mathrm{e}}}$ . (24)
The mapping from the PLM (perceived law of motion) to the ALM (actual law of motion) is therefore given
by $\Gamma(\theta^{\epsilon})$ .
Lemma 7Let $\mathrm{b}$ $\equiv(1-\alpha-g)$ A. Then, $ike$ mapping $\Gamma$ satisfies (a) $\lim_{\thetaarrow \mathrm{b}}\Gamma’(\theta)=\infty$ , (b) $\lim_{\thetaarrow\infty}\Gamma’(\theta)=$
$0$ , and (c) $\Gamma’(\theta)>0$ for all $\theta$ if and only $if\overline{b}h(I)I/\gamma(I)+1-\alpha>g$ .
Proof. From (24), it is easy to show that
$\Gamma’(\theta)=\frac{\alpha A^{2}}{1-\gamma(I)}\frac{\overline{b}h(I)+(1-\alpha-g)\gamma(I)/I}{[(1-\alpha-g)A-\theta]^{2}}$ .
The rest is immediate. $\blacksquare$
The condition for $\mathrm{E}$-stability is $\Gamma’(\theta^{\mathrm{e}})<1$ . Figures $2\mathrm{a}$ and $\mathrm{b}$ depict the map $\Gamma$ . As shown in these
figures, there are two distinct fixed points and the curve cuts the 45 degree line from above (below) at the
low-growth (high-growth) equilibrium if $g$ is small (large) relative to $\overline{b}$ . This establishes that $\Gamma’(\theta^{\mathrm{e}})<1$




Proposition 8(a) The low-grouth equilibrium is $E$-stable, and (b) the high groeuth equilibrium is $E$ stable
if and only $\dot{\iota}f\overline{b}h(I)I/\gamma(I)+1-\alpha<g$ .
According to proposition 8, the low-growth equilibrium is selected as adaptively stable one. Further, the
high-growth equilibrium becomes stable if the deficit is small or the targeted debt-GDP ratio is high. An
important policy implication is that if the monetary authority pegs the nominal interest rate, then ther
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arises the possibility of expectational indeterminacy in the sense of Evans et al. (1998). This proposition
also implies that such indeterminacy can be overcome by appropriately chosen fiscal parameters, $\overline{b}$ , and $g$ .
3.4 Stability of Sunspot Equilibrium
This subsection considers existence and stability of possible sunspot equilibria (SSEs) of the economy. In
order to make the model comparable to Evans and Honkapohja’s $(1994, 2001\mathrm{b})$ results, rewrite (17) as
$\theta_{t}=\Omega^{-1}(\theta_{t+1})=\frac{\alpha A^{2}\overline{b}H(I)}{[1-g-\alpha H(I)]A-\theta_{t+1}}\equiv F(\theta_{t})$ , (25)
which defines the temporary equilibrium map from expectations about the next period output growth rate
to the current one. Consider asunspot variable $s_{t}$ which follows aMarkov chain with transition probabilities
$\pi_{\dot{|}j}$ , which is the probability that the current state is $i$ and the next state is $j$ . For the case of a2-state
Markov chain, $\pi_{12}=1-\pi_{11}$ and $\pi_{21}=1-\pi_{22}$ . The following definitions are due to Evans and Honkapohja
(1994).
Definition 9 $(\theta_{1}, \theta_{2})$ is a $Z$-state Markov sunspot equilibr ium with transition probabilities $0<\pi_{\dot{|}\mathrm{j}}<1\dot{\iota}f$
$\theta_{1}=\pi_{11}F(\theta_{1})+(1-\pi_{11})F$ (B2) and $\theta_{2}=(1-\pi_{22})\mathrm{F}(9\mathrm{i})+\pi_{22}F(\theta_{2})$ .
Definition 10 Local animal spirits sunspots are stationary sunspot equilibria (SSEs) for which the two
states are near distinct rest points $\theta_{L}$ and $\theta_{H}$ , such that $\theta_{L}=F(\theta_{L})$ and $\theta_{H}=F(\theta_{H})$ .
According to Evans and Honkapohja (1994), the conditions for the existence of local animal spirits
sunspots are $F’(\mathrm{B}\mathrm{L})\neq 1$ and $F’(\theta_{H})\neq 1$ . Since 0’ $(\theta_{L})>1>\Omega’(\theta_{H})$ and $F’(\theta)=1/\mathrm{Q}’(\mathrm{B})$ hold in this
economy, it is easy to check that $F’$ (B1) $<1<F’(\mathrm{B}\mathrm{H})$ , which ensures $F’(\theta_{L})\neq 1$ and $F’(\theta_{H})\neq 1$ . Thus,
local animal spirits sunspots exist near the balanced growth equilibria $\theta_{L}$ and $\theta_{H}$ .
Proposition 11 (Evans and Honkapohja (1994)) Local animal $sp\dot{|}fits$ sunspots are (a) weakly E-stable
if and only if $F’(\mathrm{B}\mathrm{L})<1$ and $F’(\theta_{H})<1$ , and (b) strongly $E$-stable $l\dot{f}$ and only $\dot{.}f|F’(\mathrm{B}\mathrm{L})<1$ ated
$|F’(\theta_{H})|<1$ .
Proof. See Evans and Honkapohja (1994). @
The terminology “weak $\mathrm{B}$-stability”is used here to denote the standard $\mathrm{B}$-stability notion in order to
distinguish this ffom a stronger notion of $\mathrm{B}$-stability, “strong $\mathrm{E}$-stability.”The notion of strong $\mathrm{E}$ stability,
which is concerned with stability of an overparameterized system, is suggested and discussed at length in
Evans and Honkapohja $(1994, 2001)$ . In what follows, Iwill use proposition 11 as the stability conditions
for the model. The distinction between weak and strong $\mathrm{E}$-stability, however, will not be emphasized
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Proposition 12 Local animal spirits sunspots near $\theta_{L}$ and $\theta_{H}$ are not E-stable.
Proof. The result is easily checked because $F’(\theta_{L})<1<F’(\theta_{H})$ holds. $\blacksquare$
4Targeting Debt to Control Inflation
4.1 Characterization
This section considers an alternative scenario in which the fiscal authority is active in the sense that it targets
the tax rate as well as the debt-GDP ratio. Thus, the central bank has to adjust the nominal interest rate
so as to be consistent with all other equilibrium conditions. Accordingly, the gross nominal interest rate is
endogenous.
The money market equilibrium requires %=(1-\mbox{\boldmath $\alpha$}-\mbox{\boldmath $\tau$}) $\gamma(I_{t+1})$ and the capital market equilibrium
implies
$\theta_{t+1}=A(1-\alpha-\tau)[1-\gamma(I_{t+1})]-A\overline{b}\equiv\ominus(I_{t+1})$ . (26)
It is easy to check that $\Theta’(I)=-A(1-\alpha-\tau)\gamma’(I)>0$ . In words, the nominal interest rate and the
output growth rate are positively related. The government’s budget constraint can be rewritten as
$g= \tau+\overline{b}-\frac{\alpha A}{\theta_{t}}\overline{b}+(1-\alpha-\tau)\gamma(I_{t+1})-\frac{\alpha A}{I_{t}}\frac{1}{\theta_{t}}(1-\alpha-\tau)\gamma(I_{t})$, (27)
The evolution of the economy is described by (26) and (27).
4.2 Balanced Growth Equilibrium
At any balanced growth equilibrium, $\theta_{t}=\theta$ and $I_{t}=I$ for all $t$ . Thus, abalanced growth equilibrium solves
$I= \frac{\mathrm{r}\alpha A(1-\alpha-\tau)\gamma(\underline{I})-}{\sim\tau-g+\overline{b}+(1-\alpha-\tau)\gamma(I)\Theta(I)-\alpha A\overline{b}}\equiv J(I)$ . (28)
It will be helpful to study some properties of the function $J$.
Lemma 13 $J’(I)<0$ holds.
Proof. Prom (28), it is straightforward to show that
Since 7’ $(I)<0$ , $J’(I)<0$ holds. $\blacksquare$
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Prom lemma 13 it is easy to show that the mapping $J$ has aunique fixed point. The typical configuration
of the function $J$ is depicted in figure 3. The question here is whether the fixed point constitutes an
equilibrium. Namely, one needs to check if the fixed point satisfies $I\geq 1$ , which is the natural lower bound
for the gross nominal interest rate or equivalently the nominal interest factor.
Example 14 Let $A=3$ , $\alpha=0.33$ , $\rho=0.2$ , $\sigma=0.6$ , $g=0.02$ , $\tau=0$, $and\overline{b}=0.25$ . Then, there is a unique
balanced growth equilibrium utdh $I=1.03$ and the corresponding output growth rate and inflation rate are
$\theta=1.05$ and $\Pi=1.04$ .
Proposition 15 (a) An increase in the government spending raises the nominal interest rate, the inflation
rate, and the output growth rate, (b) An increase in the target debt-GDP ratio reduces the nominal interest
rate, the inflation rate, and the output growth rate if and only if $\theta>A(1-g)/2$ .
$\mathrm{P}$roof. (a) Omitted, (b) Prom (28),
$\frac{dI}{d\overline{b}}=\frac{\partial J/\partial\overline{b}}{1-J(I)},$ ,
where $J’(I)$
So $\partial J/\partial\overline{b}<0$ if and only if
$(1- \alpha-\tau)[1-\gamma(I)]+\frac{g-1}{2}>\overline{b}$,
which, using (26), can be rewritten as $\theta>A(1-g)/2$ . @
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4.3 Dynamics: Local Indeterminacy
Inow turn to describing dynamic properties of the economy. Substitute (26) into (27) to obtain
(29)
ffom which one can define the perfect-foresight dynamics, $I_{t+1}=\gamma^{-1}(\Phi(I_{t}))$ . Linearize (29) around the
steady state to obtain $dI_{t+1}=Ddlu$ where
Then, the unique balanced growth equilibrium is locally determinate if and only if $|D|>1$ . This implies
that sunspots near the single balanced growth equilibrium exist if and only if $|D|<1$ .
4.4 Stability under Learning





$m_{t}=(1-\alpha-\tau)\gamma I_{t+1}^{\epsilon}\dot{|}$ , (31)
where $I_{t+1}^{\mathrm{e}}$ is apoint expectation of the gross nominal interest rate. (13), (15), and (11) combined with
$b_{t}=\overline{b}$ yield
$\theta_{t+1}=A(1-\alpha-\tau)1-\gamma I_{t+1}^{\mathrm{e}}-A\overline{b}\equiv\Theta I_{t+1}^{\mathrm{e}}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}-\mathrm{i}1$ (32)
Substitute (31), (32), and the Fisher equation into the government’s budget constraint (11) to obtain the
actual gross nominal interest rate
(30)
It follows therefore the differential equation $dP/ds$ $=\Gamma$ (Je)-I, where
$\Gamma(I^{e})=\lim_{tarrow\infty}J^{\mathfrak{l}}\Gamma_{t+1}$ , $I_{t}^{\mathrm{e}}= \frac{\mathrm{r}\alpha A(1-\alpha-\tau)\gamma_{-}(I^{\mathrm{e}})}{\overline{(1-\alpha-\tau)\gamma}\overline{(I^{\mathrm{e}})+\overline{b}-g}\Theta(\overline{I^{\mathrm{e}}})-\alpha A\overline{b}}=J(I^{\mathrm{e}})\mathrm{I}$ .
The condition for $\mathrm{B}$-stability is $\Gamma’(I^{e})<1$ . Thus, it is now obvious that the following result is true.
Proposition 16 The unique balanced growth equilibrium is E stable.
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45Stability of Sunspot Equilibrium
Ihave pointed out that the model generates sunspot fluctuations around the unique balanced growth path
if it is indeterminate. This subsection is concerned with stability of such sunspot equilibria. Rewrite (29)
as $I_{t}=\Phi^{-1}(\gamma(I_{t+1}))\equiv F(I_{t+1})$ , where Iuse the same notation $F$ in order to make it easier to apply
Evans and Honkapohja’s $(1994, 2001\mathrm{b})$ results to this model. It is well-known that sunspot equilibrium
exists if $|F’(I)|>1$ . The question here is whether such SSEs are E–stable Let $(I_{1}, I_{2})$ be a2-state Markov
sunspot equilibrium with transition probabilities $0<\pi_{\dot{|}j}<1$ if $I_{1}=\pi_{11}F(I_{1})+(1-\pi_{11})F(I_{2})$ and
$I_{2}=(1-\pi_{22})F(I_{1})+\pi_{22}F$ (J2). Further, Let )) solve $\mathrm{b}$ $=F(\hslash\cdot$
Proposition 17 (Evans and Hon ohja (2001b)) (a) If $F’(\mathfrak{h}<1$ , then every $SSEsu$ fi\sigma nay n\mbox{\boldmath $\alpha$}
the steady state is $E$-unstable. (b) If $F’(\mathrm{r}<-1,$ $d\iota en$ ffieoe exists an $E$-stable $SSE(I_{1}, I_{2})$ near the steady
state.
Proof. See Evans and Honkapohja (2001b). $\blacksquare$
5Conclusion
This paper studied amonetary-fiscal policy regime where the fiscal authority targets the debt GDP ratio. If
the monetary authority is active and targets the nominal interest rate, then two balanced growth equilibria
are shown to exist. The low-growth equilibrium is stable under learning. If there is no active monetary
authority, then aunique balanced growth equilibrium obtains. The unique balanced growth path is stable
under learning. This suggests that it is at least theoretically possible that the fiscal authority’s actions alone
determine growth and inflation in the long run. This would add another support for the view that the fiscal
authority’s coordinated actions are required for price (and output) stability. Although uniqueness obtains,
the economy without an active monetary authority can be subject to adaptively stable sunspot fluctuations.
References
[1] Bencivenga, and Bruce D. Smith. “Financial Intermediation and Endogenous Growth,” Review of Ec0-
nomic Studies 58 (1991) 195-209.
[2] Bhattacharya, Joydeep, and Joseph Haslag. “Reliance, Composition, and Inflation,” Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas, Economic and Financial Review 4th qtr (2000) 2028.
127
[3] Bhattacharya, Joydeep, and Noritaka Kudoh. “Tight Money Policies and Inflation Revisited” , Canadian
Journal of Economics (2002) 185-217.
[4] Chari, V. V., Laurence J. Christiano, and Patrick J. Kehoe. “Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy:
Some Recent Results.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 23 (1991) 519-539.
[5] Espinosa Vega, Marco A., and Chong K. Yip. “Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interactions in an Endoge
nous Growth Model with Financial Intermediaries,” International Economic Review 40 (1999) 595-613.
[6] Evans, George W., and Seppo Honkapohja. “On the Local Stability of Sunspot Equilibria under Adap
tive Learning Rules,” Joumal of Economic Theory 64 (1994) 142-161.
[7] Evans, George W., and Seppo Honkapohja. Learning and Expectations in Macroeconomics, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey (2001a)
[8] Evans, George W., and Seppo Honkapohja. “Existence of Adaptibly Stable Sunspot Equilibria near an
Indeterminate Steady State,” Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming (2001b)
[9] Evans, George W., Seppo Honkapohja, and Paul Romer. “Growth Cycles,” American Economic Review
88 (1998) 495515.
[10] Kudoh, Noritaka. “Monetary Policy Rules in an Endogenous Growth Model,” mimeo, (2002)
[11] Lettau, Martin, and Timothy Van Zandt. “Robustness of Adaptive Expectations as an Equilibrium
Selection Devioe,” Macroeconomic Dynarnics, forthcoming.
[12] Lucas, Robert, and Nancy Stokey. “Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy without Cap
ital,” Journal of Monetary Economics 12 (1983) 55-93.
[13] Sargent, Thomas J., and Neil Wallace. “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic.” Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review (1981) 1-17
128
